The Role of Information Disparity in the 1994/95 Mexican Peso by Christina Bannier
The Role of Information Disparity in the 1994/95 Mexican
Peso Crisis: Empirical Evidence¤
Christina E. Bannier (nee Metz)y
August 13, 2003
Abstract
In the Mexican Peso crisis 1994/95, the lack of readily available information,
particularly regarding monetary aggregates, has often been commented on. This
paper analyzes empirically whether information disparity with respect to economic
fundamentals contributed to the crisis. Using historical forecast data collected by
Consensus Economics, we show that uncertainties, as measured by the forecast
variation, signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the pressure on the ﬁxed Peso rate. This eﬀect is
additional to the one that actual and expected fundamentals had on the exchange
rate pressure. Furthermore, the impact of information disparity is found to be
contingent on the market expectation about fundamentals. It seems that the cen-
tral bank’s strategy of not publicly disclosing information was detrimental for the
very reason that the market sentiment was generally optimistic with regard to the
monetary development.
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The Mexican Peso crisis 1994/95 is an interesting subject for studying the impact of
information disparity among market participants in currency crises. Due to the in-
creasing volume of information disclosed to ﬁnancial markets and the sheer number of
information processing and disseminating sources, analysis of informational impacts has
gained importance in economic research. Financial crisis situations, in which market
participants tend to coordinate their actions, are an especially noteworthy case to study
the question of whether information disparity might have triggered the event. Finding
an answer to this question is also of import for policy purposes. Because the central
bank is one of the major sources for information disclosure with regard to economic fun-
damentals, it stands to reason whether, as is often proclaimed, increased transparency
in situations of ﬁnancial turmoil is actually conducive to preventing a crisis. In the
case of the Mexican Peso crisis in 1994/95, the authorities chose a two-tiered strategy:
whereas information about the real economy (GDP, trade balance, etc.) was made pub-
lic regularly and timely, the central bank decided to disclose hardly any numbers on
monetary aggregates. This strategy, however, did not prevent the attack on the Peso
and its eventual free fall in December 1994. This paper scrutinizes the course of events
and tries to verify empirically whether aspects of information disparity contribute to an
explanation of the Peso crisis.
Theoretical studies on the role of information in currency crises came to diﬀerent conclu-
sions regarding the informational impact on speculators’ behaviour. Second-generation
currency crisis models (Obstfeld 1994, 1996) claimed that large sets of economic funda-
mentals may be accompanied by multiple equilibria. These equilibria are characterized
by self-fulﬁlling expectations, such that a currency crisis takes place whenever market
participants believe an attack will be successful. In other words, the same fundamen-
tal state of the economy might coincide with ﬁnancial stability as long as speculators
do not believe in the success of an attack. Second-generation models therefore do not
allow to predict the occurrence of a crisis or to assess the exact role of information and
traders’ expectations. Also these models make rather extreme assumptions with regard
to traders’ knowledge of the economic fundamentals. Subsequent work relaxed these
assumptions, focussing on information asymmetries among speculators. The models by
Morris and Shin (1998, 1999, 2000) analyzed both private (individual) and public (com-
mon) information about economic fundamentals. These authors showed that whenever
private information is suﬃciently precise relative to public information, the currency
1crisis model has a unique equilibrium. In this case, the fundamental state of the econ-
omy alone determines whether a successful attack on the ﬁxed parity will take place
or whether the exchange rate peg will remain stable. These papers were followed by
work that scrutinized the impact of information disparity about economic fundamentals
on crisis situations. Heinemann and Illing (2002) argue that in an environment where
information is entirely private, a decrease in uncertainty following a dissemination of
very precise information reduces the likelihood of a speculative attack. Metz (2002)
arrives at diﬀerent results under the assumption that market participants have access
to both private and public information. In such a model, not only the market sentiment
- deﬁned as the mean of public information about economic fundamentals - inﬂuences
the probability of a speculative attack, but so does the uncertainty among speculators
as measured by the variance of information. Surprisingly, the eﬀect of uncertainty in
private information on the onset of a crisis is for the main part opposite to the impact of
uncertainty that arises from public information. Another interesting ﬁnding is that the
impact of uncertainty in general is contingent on the market sentiment, i.e. on whether
the market is optimistic or pessimistic with regard to how the economy’s fundamental
state develops. According to Metz (2002), the eﬀect of information disparity on a cur-
rency crisis depends on both the source of information, i.e. whether uncertainty stems
from private or public information, and on the prevailing market sentiment regarding
the economic environment.
To date, there has been little empirical work on the role of information disparity in
currency crises. Two notable exceptions are the papers by Prati and Sbracia (2002) and
Tillmann (2002). Prati and Sbracia (2002) study the impact of uncertainty stemming
from both public and private information, following work by Morris and Shin (1999,
2000), on the 1997/98 Asian crisis. Using forecast data from Consensus Economics
to build an indicator of information uncertainty, Prati and Sbracia ﬁnd for a panel
of six Asian countries covering the period January 1995 through May 2001, that the
variance of information has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the observed currency devaluations.
The authors succeed in showing that the sign of the impact of the variance depends on
whether expected fundamentals are “good” or “bad”. However, their model does not
allow to distinguish between the two types of information (private or public) as source
of the observed information uncertainty. Hence, they cannot assess the implications of
the disclosure policies of the respective national authorities for the information disparity
that prevailed during the Asian crisis. Tillmann (2002) chose a diﬀerent approach. He
analyzes the impact of uncertainty that solely originates from private information among
2foreign exchange traders. Within a Markov-switching framework, he ﬁnds that, for the
crises of the French Franc and the Italian Lira in 1992, increasing information disparity
indeed raises the probability of a speculative attack. As a measure of information
disparity among market participants he employs so-called country fund discounts, that
is the diﬀerence between the price of closed-end country funds and their underlying net
asset value.
This paper examines empirically the inﬂuence of information and uncertainty on the
event of a currency crisis as suggested in Metz (2002). Because the Mexican Peso cri-
sis 1994/95 has often been mentioned as a situation in which the lack of information
about economic variables was causal to the currency turmoil, we try to test the theo-
retical implications against the background of the Mexican economy using a data set
from 1993 to 2000. Indices representing private and public information at the time are
based on data obtained from Consensus Economics. This data set contains one-year
forecasts of various economic variables as announced by diﬀerent forecasting research
agencies, banks, and other ﬁnancial institutions. In comparison with Prati and Sbra-
cia (2002), our regression model includes a more comprehensive, two-dimensional index
of information, so that the model accounts simultaneously for diﬀerent sources of un-
certainty, that is, private and public. This study therefore allows to draw conclusions
about the eﬀectiveness of the information policy pursued by the Mexican authorities at
the time. Our analysis oﬀers the following main three results. First, we show that the
mean of forecast values has an unambiguously negative impact on the exchange rate
pressure. This leads us to conclude that an improvement in the market sentiment, i.e.
of the commonly held belief about the fundamental state of the economy, lowers the
likelihood of a currency crisis. Second, we ﬁnd that informational uncertainty exerts a
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the incidence of a crisis as well. This eﬀect depends on whether
the prevailing market sentiment is optimistic or pessimistic. The impact of uncertainty
among market participants therefore may be harmful or benevolent, depending on the
underlying market sentiment. In other words, increased disclosure of information as a
transparency enhancing policy measure is not necessarily conducive to preventing crises.
Third, in the case of the Mexican Peso crisis, it seems that the central bank’s strategy
of disclosing hardly any numbers about monetary aggregates, thereby increasing un-
certainty, was particularly harmful since the market in general was still very optimistic
about the monetary development. With respect to information about the real econ-
omy, we ﬁnd that rather a decreasing uncertainty among speculators, accompanied by
a deteriorating market sentiment, might have triggered the crisis.
3The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
model, which delivers testable implications with regard to the inﬂuence of information
on the currency crisis. Section 3 recounts the course of events in the Mexican Peso crisis
1994/95 with emphasis on the disclosure of information. Section 4 provides an overview
on the data, describes the empirical methodology and presents the test results. Section
5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Model
The model we use as background for our empirical study is a simple coordination game
that builds on Morris and Shin (1999, 2000) and Metz (2002). It rests on the pre-
sumption that speculators possess both private and public information about economic
fundamentals. Private information in this respect can be interpreted as insider informa-
tion or simply as individual interpretation of commonly accessible information. Hence,
private information will diﬀerentiate within market participants. Public information,
in contrast, is commonly shared by all traders. Moreover, all traders know that each of
them disposes of this information, so that it becomes common knowledge. Both types
of information can be incomplete in the sense that they are faulty signals of the true
fundamental state of the economy.
This section depicts a very simple coordination game between a large number of foreign
exchange traders, i 2 [0;1], and a central bank that tries to defend a ﬁxed exchange rate
parity. Each trader is endowed with one unit of domestic currency and has to decide on
whether to use this unit in a speculative attack on the ﬁxed parity or not. A successful
attack delivers a ﬁxed payoﬀ D (> 0) to each of the attackers. Choosing to attack is
associated with transaction costs of t (0 < t < D). For the central bank it is assumed
that she enjoys a positive utility from keeping the peg. The costs of defending the
parity, however, increase in the proportion l of attackers, and decrease in the economic
fundamental index µ. For simplicity, we assume that the central bank has to give in to
an attack and devalue the exchange rate whenever the proportion of attacking traders
l is at least as high as µ. If l < µ, the central bank is able to maintain the ﬁxed-rate
regime.
The time structure of the game is as follows. Assume that the fundamental state of
the economy is represented by an index, denoted µ, of fundamentally relevant vari-
ables. In a ﬁrst step, nature selects the fundamental state µ » N(y; 1
®). The central
4bank observes the true fundamental state, whereas speculators only get to know its
distribution. Because the distribution of µ is assumed to be common information, we
refer to ® as the precision of public information. The mean of public information, y,
is denoted as market sentiment. A good or optimistic market sentiment then refers to
a high prior mean of the fundamental state, a bad or pessimistic sentiment to a low
prior mean y. In addition to public information, speculators individually receive private
signals xijµ » N(µ; 1
¯), which are independent of each other. Again, ¯ is denoted as
precision of private information. Contingent on private and public information, traders
simultaneously have to decide whether or not to attack the ﬁxed parity in the second
step. The central bank ﬁnally observes the proportion l of attackers and abandons the
peg whenever l ¸ µ.
The equilibrium in this model is found in best-response trigger strategies.1 The equilib-
rium consists of a unique value for private information, denoted by x¤, such that each
speculator with a signal xi lower than x¤ attacks the parity, but refrains from doing so
for better private information. The central bank’s best response to this strategy is to
abandon the ﬁxed parity whenever a fundamental state µ is realized which is lower than
a unique threshold value µ¤. For better, i.e. higher, economic states µ, the ﬁxed-rate
regime is maintained.
The solution to this model is determined by solving the equilibrium conditions back-
wards. The central bank is indiﬀerent between abandoning and keeping the peg when-
ever the proportion of attacking speculators l is equal to the realized fundamental state
µ. Out of the continuum of speculators, only those will attack who observe private
signals lower than x¤. Thus, we can write:
µ = Prob(x · x¤jµ)
µ = Φ(¯(x¤ ¡ µ)) : (1)
Each individual speculator is indiﬀerent between attacking or not attacking the ﬁxed
parity if both actions lead to the same expected net-payoﬀ:
0 = D Prob(µ · µ¤jxi) ¡ t : (2)
Given the posterior distribution of fundamentals, the speculator’s indiﬀerence condition
reads:
t = D Φ
¡p









1A proof of best-response strategies that deliver the unique equilibrium is given in Morris and Shin
(1998).
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As Morris and Shin (1999, 2000) and Metz (2002) show, the equilibrium (µ¤, x¤) is
unique as long as private information is suﬃciently precise,2 i.e. for ¯ > ®2
2¼. The
existence of a unique equilibrium allows us to do rigorous comparative analysis. In
the following, we will brieﬂy restate the main results by Metz (2002) with regard to
the inﬂuence of the informational parameters on the probability of a currency crisis.
Afterwards we will focus on testable implications of the model, building on Prati and
Sbracia (2002), to use in an empirical analysis of the 1994/95 Mexican Peso crisis.
In the model, the ﬁxed parity will be abandoned whenever the index of economic fun-
damentals falls short of the trigger threshold µ¤. Hence, the ex-ante probability of a
currency crisis can reasonably be approximated by the length of the interval [¡1;µ¤].
Proposition 1 (Metz 2002)
The probability of a currency crisis, as approximated by the length of the interval





the likelihood of a crisis decreases (increases) in the precision ® of public information.
For y > (<) µ¤ ¡ 1 p
®+¯Φ¡1( t
D), the probability of a crisis increases (decreases) in the
precision ¯ of private information.
The most interesting result of this proposition concerns the largely opposite eﬀects of
private and public information’s precision. The impact of both precision parameters
is moreover found to be contingent on the market sentiment. The intuition behind
this result is the role of coordination in the model. When deciding whether or not to
attack, each speculator not only has to take into account his own information about the
unknown fundamental state, but also his opponents’ expectations about µ. The more
strongly one speculator believes his opponents’ private information to be similar to his
own, the more he is willing to rely on this type of information. Consider the following
example: assume that, a priori, the market expects the fundamental state to be bad,
2For an intuition behind the uniqueness result, see the infection argument as suggested by Morris et
al. (1995).
6i.e. y is low. If public information is very precise relative to private information, each
speculator knows that all other traders will attach a large weight to the pessimistic
prior mean y. This provides a strong incentive for attacking the ﬁxed parity. If, in
contrast, private information is much more precise than public, then traders know that
all others will tend to neglect the low prior mean. This might decrease the incentive to
attack. The opposite holds for an optimistic market, where the prior expected value of
the fundamental state, y, is high.3
Concerning our primary objective of empirically analyzing the role of information dis-
parity in a currency crisis, it is hard to ﬁnd a measure for the crisis probability, though.
In a paper by Prati and Sbracia (2002) slightly diﬀerent results are derived, which
deliver more easily testable implications. These authors focus on the inﬂuence of the
parameters on the proportion of attacking speculators, i.e. of those who receive suﬃ-
ciently low private signals. A natural empirical counterpart for the share of attackers
might be found in the exchange rate pressure.
Proposition 2 (Prati and Sbracia 2002)
The share of attackers on a ﬁxed exchange rate, as given by Prob(xi · x¤jµ), decreases





D), the share of attackers decreases (increases) in the precision of public
information ®. If µ > (<) x¤+2¯ @x¤
@¯ , the proportion of attacking speculators decreases
(increases) in the precision of private information ¯.
Intuitively, both improving fundamentals and an improving market belief about funda-
mentals decrease the pressure on a ﬁxed exchange rate. As before, the eﬀect of a change
in the precision of public information ® depends on the market sentiment. Whenever the
market is optimistic, i.e. y is suﬃciently high, more precise public information reduces
the incentive to attack so that the share of attackers diminishes. For a low prior mean
of fundamentals y the opposite holds. However, the impact of changes in ¯ is no longer
necessarily opposite to the eﬀect of ®. The inﬂuence of private information’s precision ¯
is not even directly contingent on the market sentiment any more. It rather depends on
the actually realized fundamental state of the economy µ. How do we have to interpret
this result? In contrast to ®, the precision of private information ¯ not only inﬂuences
the posterior expected fundamental state and, hence, the trigger value x¤, but it also
3For a more comprehensive delineation of the comparative statics and the underlying structure of
the equilibrium in this model, see also Metz (2003).
7determines the distribution of private signals around the unknown µ. Thus, ¯ has two
distinct channels through which it inﬂuences the proportion of attacking traders. First
of all, ¯ aﬀects the threshold x¤ through equilibrium condition (5). This eﬀect is again
opposite to the eﬀect of ® on x¤. Secondly, whenever the realized fundamental state of
the economy is suﬃciently good (µ > x¤), more precise private information makes less
speculators receive private signals below the threshold of x¤, because the distribution
of private signals becomes more dense around its mean of µ. Hence, the proportion of
attacking traders decreases. The opposite holds in the case of a bad fundamental state
µ (µ < x¤). This second eﬀect of ¯ on the share of attackers may even outweigh the
ﬁrst, which tends to be the case if either µ and y are both suﬃciently good or both are
suﬃciently bad. Then, the impact of private information precision ¯ is analogous to
public information precision ® on the proportion of attackers. In contrast, if either µ is
low and the market sentiment very optimistic, i.e. y is high, or vice versa, then ® and
¯ tend to have opposite eﬀects on the share of attackers.
What are the testable implications of the theoretical model? First of all, the model states
that the prior expected fundamental state of the economy, i.e. the market’s general
expectation of the fundamental index, y, decreases the pressure on the exchange rate.
Secondly, the model shows that the precision of information has an individual eﬀect on
exchange rate pressure. This eﬀect is contingent on i) the source of uncertainty, i.e.
on whether it originates from private or public information, and on ii) the prior mean
of economic fundamentals, i.e. on whether the market is optimistic or pessimistic with
regard to economic development.
Before the testing procedure with respect to these statements and the data are described,
let us ﬁrst recount the course of events in the 1994/95 Mexican Peso crisis. As we will see,
the way in which the events unfolded displays most interesting characteristics regarding
the inﬂuence of information disparity.
3 The Mexican Peso Crisis in 1994/95
Mexico was an episode of ﬁnancial stability and growth from the mid-1950s to the
1970s. This stability ended when Mexico became insolvent in 1982. After the collapse
of the economy, the Mexican government started a comprehensive reform program. The
reform comprised a fundamental opening of the country to international competition,
privatization and deregulation, ﬁxing the exchange rate against the U.S.$, and the so-
8called Pacto, an agreement between government, labor unions and the private sector to
guide the development of prices, wages and the exchange rate. The successful execution
of the reforms shifted international attention towards the Mexican ﬁnancial markets
and strengthened investors’ conﬁdence in the country. By the end of 1992, Mexico
had achieved ﬁscal balance, and inﬂation was reduced to single digits. Restrictive
ﬁscal policy also helped stabilizing the exchange rate. Between 1988 and 1994, Mexico
changed its exchange rate system several times, from a completely ﬁxed parity to a
preannounced rate of devaluation, and ﬁnally to a band with a sliding ceiling. Until the
autumn of 1993, the Peso exchange rate was stable, hovering in the lower half of the
band.
Concerning the success of the reforms, Edwards (1997) notes that a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
had arisen between Mexico’s achievements in terms of reform policies and in terms
of economic results. Although political achievements were sometimes spectacular, the
economic achievements were rather modest. The rate of real growth averaged 2.8 percent
between 1988 and 1994. Productivity growth was near zero, and private savings were
decreasing. Yet, on the positive side, capital inﬂows into the country remained strong
until the beginning of 1994.
What is important for interpreting the onset of the crisis in the light of our theoretical
ﬁndings is that the economic situation in Mexico at the beginning of the 1990s was
highly praised by economists, ﬁnancial experts, academics and the media in general.
With only very few exceptions, the Mexican reforms were seen as a major success, with
Mexico’s development representing a miracle among the group of emerging countries.
The fact that economic growth was still low and the current account deﬁcit increasing,
was mostly neglected by commentators. Even if the lack of fundamental growth was
taken into account, it was argued that positive results were “around the corner” (Calvo
et al., 1996). One of the few economists to argue against this common trend of praising
Mexican reform eﬀorts was Rudiger Dornbusch. As early as 1992, he claimed that
Mexico’s most urgent problem was its overvalued exchange rate. However, there was
large dissent about this point in the community. While some market observers did
not believe the ﬁxed exchange rate to be overvalued, others claimed that, due to the
surge in capital inﬂows, Mexico experienced an “equilibrium appreciation” that was
fully justiﬁed by fundamentals. A more moderate view admitted that, although Mexico
had a growth problem, this was only transitory and would be solved automatically over
time (Gil-Diaz, 1997). Dornbusch and Werner, however, feared the overvaluation to be
a serious, long-lasting problem: “Overvaluation stops growth and, more often than not,
9ends in a speculative siege on the exchange rate and ultimately currency realignment”
(Dornbusch and Werner, 1994).
To give an overview on the widely diverging views that economists, ﬁnancial analysts,
and market commentators held at the beginning of the 1990s, consider the following col-
lection of statements as taken from Edwards (1997). The IMF praised Mexico’s reform
eﬀorts until only a few months before the crisis hit the economy in December 1994. In
October 1994, the IMF’s World Economic Outlook predicted that, although growth had
been low, it would quickly pick up speed. The World Bank held an ambiguous view. At
the 1993 Annual Meeting, the World Bank stated that the Mexican reform process was
mature and appeared to be consolidated. In a publication in November 1994, the World
Bank argued that with the president elect, Ernesto Zedillo, the economy would improve
rapidly and economic growth would reach its highest level in ﬁve years. In contrast,
an article in Trend in Developing Economies in 1993 stated that the recent slowdown
in Mexican growth was a direct consequence of the real exchange rate appreciation. In
November 1992, the bank noted that the opening of the capital account exposed Mexico
to large risks resulting from the volatility of short-term capital movements, which might
need adjustment through higher interest rates or a depreciation of the Peso. In con-
trast, investment bankers of the Mexican economy and fund managers were generally
enthusiastic about the prospects. JP Morgan, as late as October 1994, and the Swiss
Bank Corporation, even in December 1994, urged a credit rating upgrade for Mexico.
According to Edwards (1997), out of twenty studies released by major institutions in
the Emerging Markets Investor in November/December 1994, twelve dismissed the pos-
sibility of a Peso devaluation. Euromoney raised the country risk ranking for Mexico
between March and September 1994. However, Dornbusch argued in November 1992
that the daily rate of depreciation for the Peso should be tripled to prevent a major
crisis. The Mexican central bank explained that, although the capital account was in
deﬁcit, the exchange rate band might deal with possible disequilibria. Furthermore,
productivity was expected to surge before long and fundamentals to remain healthy. In
an interview with the Economist in January 1994, the Governor of the Mexican central
bank stated that the current account deﬁcit was associated with an inﬂow of foreign
funds rather than expansionary domestic policy and, hence, presented no problem.
Summing up we ﬁnd that, during 1993 to mid-1994, large uncertainties prevailed over
the question of whether the Peso appreciation was a temporary phenomenon or a non-
equilibrium real overvaluation. In 1994 the economic situation was aggravated by polit-
ical turmoil, and uncertainty among analysts shifted from economically related aspects
10to questions of political strategy. While at the end of 1993 the market was still enthu-
siastic about Mexico on average, the Chiapas uprising on January 1st 1994 reminded
the world that Mexico remained to be a country with social problems and inequalities.
Following this event, the exchange rate rose to the upper bound in February. Surpris-
ingly, international reserves held by the Mexican central bank did not fall, and inﬂow
of direct foreign investments did not recede. The Mexican capital markets did not even
react to the Fed’s decision to tighten U.S. monetary policy in February 1994, which was
taken as a sign of fundamental stability.
However, the climate changed abruptly with the assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio,
the presidential candidate of the ruling party PRI on March 23, 1994. This time,
investors reacted in panic and strongly reduced their exposures in Mexico. To secure
the Peso parity, the Mexican authorities intervened: reserves fell from $26 billion to $18
billion almost overnight (Lustig, 1995). Moreover, Peso interest rates were increasing
rapidly. Yet, the ﬁnancial community swiftly regained its faith after the U.S. government
decided on March 24 to extend a $6 billion swap facility to Mexico. The Financial Times
on March 25 reﬂected the conﬁdence in Mexico with the front page stating “Even with
Mexico’s dependence on foreign capital to cover a current account deﬁcit of over Dollars
20bn, a crisis is eminently avoidable”. On March 28, the Financial Times claimed that
a “sense of calm returned to Mexico”.
While the media were regaining faith, Mexico was experiencing ever larger diﬃculties
rolling over its maturing Peso denominated debt. What is more, the ﬁnancial commu-
nity seemed to have been wide aware of this fact. In April 1994, JP Morgan publicly
stated that the Mexican government would have to weigh the trade-oﬀ between rising
interest rates and devaluing the ﬁxed exchange rate to solve its problems. Quite gener-
ally, during the ﬁrst half of 1994, concerns grew among international analysts regarding
Mexico’s external situation. In the spring meeting of the Brookings Institution Eco-
nomics Panel, Calvo argued that the Mexican ﬁxed-rate regime was at risk because of
a lack of credibility. Stanley Fischer expressed doubts concerning the sustainability of
Mexico’s external situation. Members of the Fed argued that a devaluation of the Peso
should not be ruled out. On the opposite side, on May 2 1994, the U.S. Under Secretary
of the Treasury in a memorandum emphasized that Mexico’s exchange rate policy was
sustainable.
Between April and October 1994, the Mexican central bank did not disclose any informa-
tion about changes in the position of its international reserves. The exchange rate, how-
11ever, rose with the ceiling band. Also, it was observed that the central bank increasingly
replaced Peso-denominated debt (Cetes) with Dollar-denominated Tesobonos, thereby
changing the composition of money. Again, these facts were discussed in the media
and in ﬁnancial circles. During the course of the year 1994, it became clear to ﬁnan-
cial observers that the Mexican authorities deliberately withheld information on money
market aggregates and international reserves. In June 1994, an IMF mission returned
to Washington after only two weeks in Mexico, complaining that it did not obtain any
data from the Bank of Mexico on the recent development of international reserves. The
level of reserves was timely revealed for the third time in 1994 only as late as the end
of October. Several investors commented on the lack of readily available and reliable
information (Edward and Savastano, 1998). Yet, risk measures as publicly announced
by diﬀerent ﬁnancial institutions at the time indicate that the market’s perception of
the situation in Mexico remained roughly stable until December.
In August 1994, Ernesto Zedillo was elected president, the Pacto was renewed and
the exchange rate system maintained. Following the assassination of another politician
in September 1994, investors became increasingly nervous and the Mexican authorities
intensiﬁed the substitution of Tesobonos for Cetes. Although on October 21 the Mexican
central bank announced the level of international reserve holdings to be at $17:12 billion,
many analysts believed this number to be too high. At the end of November 1994,
reserves held by the central bank had reportedly decreased to $12:5 billion, with short
term public debt in excess of $27 billion. This level of reserves was clearly insuﬃcient
to back short term domestic debt, and a major ﬁnancial crisis loomed.
On December 1 1994, the new administration under President Zedillo took oﬃce. Re-
serves were suspected to continue their declining trend, although the Mexican central
bank did not disclose any new numbers. On December 5, the U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury was informed by institutional analysts’ calculations that Mexican interna-
tional reserves must be close to only $10 billion. The private sector in Mexico, however,
seemed to have been rather unaware of the fast decline of reserves during November and
December 1994. Yet, as Edwards (1997) points out, analysts should have had enough
information to calculate the necessary ﬁgures and get an idea about the country’s inter-
national reserve position. Obviously, however, ﬁnancial market participants preferred
to be seduced by the still positive information given by Mexican policy makers (Frankel
and Schmukler, 1996).
Due to the vanishing reserves, Mexican authorities decided to widen the exchange rate
12band on December 20, to allow for a devaluation of 15 percent. Yet, this policy change
was not accompanied by a supporting program, and, hence, did not appear very promis-
ing to solve the problems. Investors immediately started to ﬂee the country in disbelief.
As a result, the Mexican central bank lost $4 billion of reserves in one day, and even-
tually the ﬁxed Peso exchange rate had to be abandoned, giving in to a fully ﬂedged
currency crisis.
4 Information Disparity: Empirical Evidence
4.1 Empirical Methodology
In order to verify whether mean and dispersion of speculators’ information have a sig-
niﬁcant impact on the exchange rate pressure at the onset and during the 1994/95
Mexican Peso crisis, we use forecast data collected by Consensus Economics. These
data comprise forecasts from diﬀerent research agencies, banks, and other ﬁnancial in-
stitutions concerning various economic variables, such as GDP, industrial production,
consumer prices, current account, currency reserves, among others. In order to relate
the data to the theoretical model presented above, consider the following. Building on
Prati and Sbracia (2002), it is reasonable to assume that each of the n individual fore-
casters announces his posterior mean of the respective economic variables to Consensus
Economics. From theory, we know that the posterior expected value of µ is given by
®y+¯xi












With the number of forecasters going to inﬁnity, i.e. n ! 1, this random variable, for
a given fundamental state µ, converges to







The mean of the forecasts provided by Consensus Economics is therefore inﬂuenced
by both the prior mean y, i.e. the market sentiment, and the realized fundamental
state µ. Recall that both parameters have the same impact on exchange rate pressure
(proposition 2). Moreover, the model implies that E(µ) = y, so that the average of the
posterior expected values should be equal to the prior mean y. Note that this average
does not depend on the precision values ® and ¯ any more. We can therefore take the
13average forecast value as a proxy for the prior mean of fundamentals as represented by
the market sentiment y.











(xi ¡ ¯ x)2
n
; (8)
where ¯ x =
P
i xi
n . For n ! 1, the variance of forecasts approaches
¾2 =
¯
(® + ¯)2 : (9)
Hence, for a large number of forecasts, the dispersion of predictions only depends on
the precision parameters. The variance decreases in ®, while the impact of ¯ is negative
if ¯ > ®, and positive otherwise. This can be explained by the fact that, although more
precise private signals tend to be closer to the actual fundamental µ and thus decrease
the variance of forecasts, a higher precision of private information also increases the
weight that speculators attach to their private signals relative to public information.
This makes forecasts more heterogeneous across traders. We follow Prati and Sbracia
(2002) and assume that ¯ > maxf®; ®2
2¼g, so that the equilibrium is always unique and
the precision of private information always exerts a negative inﬂuence on the variance of
forecasts. Thus, precision of both private and public information reduces the dispersion
of forecasts.
Using the mean and variance of the economic forecasts collected by Consensus Eco-
nomics should allow a realistic assessment of the inﬂuence that market sentiment and
information dispersion exert on the exchange rate pressure. In order to capture the
informational eﬀects, we use an estimation equation of the following general form:
ERPt = °0 + °1fe
t + °2¾e
t(fe
t ¡ °t) + °3gt + ut: (10)
ERPt represents a measure of exchange rate pressure in period t. The variables fe
t and
¾e
t are, respectively, the mean and the standard deviation of forecasts regarding speciﬁc
economic variables as taken from Consensus Economics. The variable °t represents
the threshold separating “good” from “bad” expected fundamentals. It is a proxy
for the threshold functions of inﬂuence of ® and ¯ on exchange rate pressure. The
variable gt represents a function of economic variables, that might play a signiﬁcant
role in explaining exchange rate pressure. Finally, ut is the error term of the regression
equation.
14From the theoretical analysis we expect °1 to take on a negative sign. The better the
market sentiment, as represented by the mean of economic forecasts, the lower should
the pressure on the exchange rate be. The inﬂuence of the forecasts’ standard deviation,
however, depends on two facts: the market sentiment and the source of uncertainty,
private or public. If the market sentiment is very optimistic, the expression in brackets in
regression (10) is positive. In that case, uncertainty originating from public information
should have an increasing eﬀect on exchange rate pressure due to proposition 2, so that
°2 should be positive. If the market is pessimistic, the expression in brackets will be
negative, so that a decreasing eﬀect of uncertainty in public information is captured
by a positive sign of °2 as well. The parameter °2 will also be positive if uncertainty
is due to private information and actual and expected fundamentals are either both
suﬃciently good or both bad. If, however, the market sentiment is optimistic and
actual fundamentals turn out to be bad or vice versa, then uncertainty stemming from
private information will have a negative inﬂuence on ERP. The sign of °3 depends on
which speciﬁc economic variable we choose to include in the model. The exchange rate,
for instance, should have a positive impact on exchange rate pressure, i.e. the closer
the exchange rate moves to the upper ceiling of the currency band, the larger is the
incentive to attack and, thus, the higher is the exchange rate pressure.
4.2 The Data
To study the impact of information disparity on the event of the Mexican currency crisis,
we use an index of exchange rate pressure based on three parameters. The calculation
draws on Prati and Sbracia (2002). The index ERP is the sum of i) the monthly
depreciation of the Peso against the U.S. $, ii) the normalized fall in international
reserves in percent of the 12-month moving average of imports, and iii) the normalized
short-term real interest rate. Figure 1 presents the time-series behaviour of the index.4
As the ﬁgure shows, exchange rate pressure was decreasing in 1993. Pressure built up
during 1994, with a ﬁrst maximum at the time of Colosio’s assassination in March 1994.
Exchange rate pressure reached its absolute maximum in December 1994 at the top of
the crisis and decreased afterwards.
Informational data for Mexico has been taken from Consensus Economics. Note that
4In order to clarify the informational impact in the months leading up to the crisis and at the onset
of the turmoil, we will in the following concentrate on data in the period March 1993 to December 1996.
The regression analysis, however, is based on data from March 1993 to December 2000.
15all historical data for Latin America from Consensus Economics are bi-monthly, except
for the year 1993, for which only 5 data points are available, because data collection
did not start before March 1993. In each period, about 20-25 institutions announced
their forecasts of various economic variables for the current and subsequent years. In
order to work with a constant forecast horizon of one year, we follow Gourieroux and
Monfort (1997), and compute the weighted average of the current and following year
forecast with weights of 5
6 and 1
6 in the ﬁrst period, 4
6 and 2
6 in the second period etc.
As the regression results will show, in order to get a concise picture of the market’s
information at the time, only two variables turn out to be signiﬁcant: forecasts of GDP-
growth and of currency reserves held by the central bank. Once these two variables are
included into the regression, all other information parameters turn out to be largely
insigniﬁcant. For a ﬁrst impression of informational data for Mexico, see ﬁgure 2. The
chart presents the mean forecasts for GDP-growth (in percent), as one of the most
comprehensive indicators of economic development. As ﬁgure 2 shows, before the crisis
hit the Mexican economy in December 1994, average forecasts of GDP-growth were
relatively stable. At the time of the attacks, GDP-growth forecasts plummeted to
record lows, while increasing steadily in the two years following the crisis. Interestingly,
the months before the start of the currency turmoil are characterized by a decreasing
dispersion of GDP forecasts, as shown in ﬁgure 3. While the standard deviation of
GDP-growth forecasts took a value of 0.8 at the end of 1993, it fell to less than 0.5
immediately before the speculative attack hit the country. Of course, the variation in
GDP-growth forecasts spiked at the onset of the crisis in December 1994.
Figures 4 and 5 depict the development of expected currency reserves as the second ex-
planatory variable in our regression model. While market observers generally expected
currency reserves to increase during 1993 and the beginning of 1994, expectations fal-
tered later in 1994, reaching their lowest level at the time of the crisis in December
1994/January 1995. The spike in October 1994 can be explained by one of the central
bank’s few declaration of currency reserves, which gave a very optimistic view. Fig-
ure 5 shows that the variation of reserves forecasts decreased during the ﬁrst half of
1994 from a standard deviation of about 4 to half that value; the standard deviation
increased from August 1994 on and hovered at a level of around 3 until the crisis hit.
The dispersion of the forecasts reached a maximum at the end of 1995 with a standard
deviation of 5.3.
In order to arrive at a ﬁrst assessment of traders’ information about the economic state
16during the Mexican currency turmoil 1994/95, it is reasonable to compare the predicted
economic values with the realized ones. Actual and predicted development of GDP can
be seen from ﬁgure 6, the development of actual international currency reserves and
forecast values from ﬁgure 7.
Regarding GDP-growth, ﬁgure 6 shows that in 1993, actual growth rates, represented
by the light grey line, were lower than expected (black line), whereas during 1994,
speculators tended to underestimate actual GDP-growth. Hence, for the months leading
up to the currency crisis, we ﬁnd that actual and expected development of GDP did not
coincide and that the market was rather pessimistic. Combining this with our theoretical
results, we have to state that uncertainties originating from private information about
GDP-growth should have had an eﬀect on the exchange rate pressure opposite to the
one of uncertainties arising from public information about GDP development. Since
expectations about GDP-growth displayed a diminishing variance in the months leading
up to the crisis, this leads us to conclude that, if the regression analysis results in
a positive sign of uncertainty regarding GDP forecasts, then public information was
driving the predictions. If, on the other hand, the sign of GDP forecast variation is
negative, this should be taken as private information being the origin of uncertainty.
For the development of international currency reserves, ﬁgure 7 shows that, in particular
in the second half of 1994, traders were much more optimistic than warranted by the
amount of reserves actually held by the central bank (light grey line). Again, private
and public information precision therefore should be expected to have opposite eﬀects.
Combined with the formerly presented ﬁnding that the variance of forecasts with respect
to the central bank’s currency reserves was decreasing during the ﬁrst half of 1994 and
increasing during the second half, we might expect the source of uncertainty again being
found in public information. Hence, if the market generally believed currency reserves
to be still suﬃciently high, increasing uncertainty about this knowledge would raise the
pressure on the ﬁxed exchange rate. Again, this conclusion would be corroborated by a
positive sign of the variation of reserves forecasts in the regression analysis. However,
due to the fact that there was only little publicly accessible information in the market
about the level of the reserves, this variable might also be a candidate for a strong
inﬂuence of private information. The sign of information disparity should then turn out
to be negative in the regression. If this were the case, then increasing uncertainty about
currency reserves would indeed have helped to keep the ﬁxed rate regime, because this
would have eased exchange rate pressure.
174.3 Regression Results
Our test is based on a pure time-series regression, which comprises the period March









As a proxy for the prior mean information, we use forecasts both of GDP-growth (fe
GDPt)
and of the change in currency reserves (dfe
CRt). This is in contrast to Prati and Sbra-
cia (2002), who chose a one-dimensional proxy for information. Our two-dimensional
approach allows us to discriminate between diﬀerent sources of information (private or
public) as the drivers of the uncertainty among market participants. In this respect we
might suspect GDP-forecasts to be driven through public information mainly, whereas
the described lack of information about the Mexican central bank’s international re-
serves in 1994 might have caused forecasts to be more strongly based on individual
interpretations and hence to originate from private information.
In regression equation (11), the threshold value °GDPt was chosen as the yearly growth
rate of GDP. The threshold °CRt was calculated as the 5-term moving average of fore-
cast currency reserves. Note that the expression representing the deviation of market
sentiment from the actual economic variable is measured in growth rates for GDP in-
formation, but in absolute values for currency reserves information. This is due to the
fact that Consensus Economics announces only growth rates forecasts for GDP. How-
ever, the slightly diﬀerent treatment of the two variation variables of GDP forecasts
and currency reserves forecasts should not be expected to have any inﬂuence on the
regression outcome, because it only impacts the calculation of sign of the precision val-
ues and not the dispersion values per se. The same peculiarity of Consensus Economics
data forced us to use two slightly diﬀerent types of thresholds. Whereas the threshold
for GDP information, °GDPt, was calculated from actual GDP-growth rates, we had to
build a threshold from forecast data for currency reserves, °CRt. This is because the set
of research agencies announcing their forecasts to Consensus Economics changes from
period to period. Hence, we are not able to calculate the standard deviation of changes
in individual predictions with regard to currency reserves. Using actual reserves values
as thresholds, however, leads to an overweight impact of uncertainty with regard to
this variable, because currency reserves were changing strongly before and at the time
of the crisis. One reasonable compromise to ﬁnd an acceptable index of optimism or
pessimism in the market therefore is to compare predicted currency reserves with the
18long-run trend of forecasts, which leads to the described threshold series °CRt.
In addition to information with respect to GDP-growth and currency reserves develop-
ment, we also included the change in the exchange rate as an explanatory variable in
the equation. Because the ﬁxed Peso exchange rate was abandoned in December 1994,
we will ﬁnd that the exchange rate plays a signiﬁcant role in explaining exchange rate
pressure, in particular for the year 1995 and onwards.
The results from our regression for the period March 1993 through December 2000 is
depicted in table 1. The results show that the two variables representing the market
sentiment have the expected negative sign, so that, indeed, the more optimistic the
market is with respect to economic development, the lower the pressure on the exchange
rate tends to be. Both coeﬃcients (°1 and °3) are signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level. With
respect to information dispersion, our analysis states that uncertainty has a signiﬁcantly
positive inﬂuence on exchange rate pressure, since both coeﬃcients °2 and °4 have
a positive sign. However, signiﬁcance for the variation coeﬃcient in predictions of
currency reserves is given at the 1 per cent level, whereas GDP-growth forecasts have a
signiﬁcant variation coeﬃcient only at the 5 per cent level. Taking these results as such,
the model implies that the main force lying underneath fundamental uncertainty may
either be a change in the precision of public information, so that the whole market is less
sure about economic fundamentals, or uncertainty is due to a change in the precision of
private information while at the same time both expected and actual fundamentals are
either good or bad. Since we learned from the data for predicted and actual fundamental
values displayed in ﬁgures 6 and 7, that expectations did hardly coincide with the true
development of fundamentals, neither for GDP-growth nor for international currency
reserves, the type of information driving the results should, for the main part, be public.
Furthermore, we know that in the months leading up to the crisis uncertainty with
regard to GDP-growth forecasts was decreasing, while the market in general was overly
pessimistic. The opposite holds for predictions regarding currency reserves. Here, the
market was quite optimistic, while uncertainty about this view was increasing. Hence,
we might conclude that neither the way information about GDP-growth inﬂuenced
the speculators was in favour of the ﬁxed exchange rate regime in Mexico, nor was
information dissemination about currency reserves. Thus, if the Mexican central bank
deliberately held back information about the level of reserves in order to keep speculators
from attacking, the result of this strategy was exactly opposite to the intention.
Running the same regression on the pre-crisis sample, i.e. on data for the period March
191993 through December 1994 only, delivers roughly the same results. However, it is
reasonable to drop the exchange rate from the regression, because the currency peg was
fairly stable during that period. Furthermore, the coeﬃcient of the mean GDP growth
forecasts is not as signiﬁcant as for the whole sample (regression results for the pre-crisis
sample are given in table 2). Of course, it should be noted that the number of data is
strongly decreased in the pre-crisis sample, which makes the result rather weak.
What remains to be done is to verify whether the inﬂuence of information disparity on
the exchange rate pressure is indeed contingent on the market sentiment, as stated in
proposition 2. Thus, the following regression, in addition to the explanatory variables
of equation (11), allows for an impact of the simple standard deviation of GDP-growth
forecasts and of currency reserves forecasts as well. As can be seen from the results in
table 3, both additional explanatory variables turn out not to be signiﬁcant. Yet, the
mean forecasts of GDP-growth and currency reserves still have a signiﬁcantly negative
impact on the exchange rate pressure. Also, the eﬀect of uncertainty contingent on the
market sentiment has a signiﬁcantly positive sign.
Summing up our regression results we may state that information disparity strongly
attributes to an explanation of exchange rate pressure on the Peso exchange rate be-
fore, during and in the aftermath of the 1994/95 Mexican crisis. Whereas the market
sentiment has a positive inﬂuence on the ﬁxed rate regime, the eﬀect of information
uncertainty depends on whether the market is optimistic or pessimistic with regard to
economic development and on whether it is private or public information that gives rise
to the uncertainty. For the Mexican case, the model points to public information as
having triggered the event. In particular, it seems to have been the lack of publicly
available information about international currency reserves held by the central bank
that was attributable to the onset of the currency attack. This ﬁnding also indicates
that it might not have been the unobservability of the level of reserves per se but rather
the public awareness of the lack of commonly available information about it that moved
the market.
5 Conclusion
Financial market crises pose a particularly diﬃcult problem for central banks that typ-
ically have superior access to information about economic variables: how should they
disseminate their information about the state of the economy? What aggravates the
20problem is the fact that in crisis situations, traders’ actions are often strategic com-
plements so that for each individual market participant it is rational to coordinate his
own action on the actions expected of the others. Even though it is generally held
that the best remedy for ﬁnancial crises is to create full transparency about all relevant
economic variables, central banks frequently choose the opposite strategy. This has
also been done by the Mexican central bank at the onset of the Peso crisis in 1994/95.
During the economic deterioration in 1994, the bank decided to disclose hardly any new
information on the development of monetary aggregates, because this was believed to
be the most sensitive information to the market.
In our paper, we questioned whether the chosen strategy worked. Based on the results
of a theoretical model, we studied whether the market sentiment, deﬁned as the com-
mon belief of the market with regard to the economic development, had a signiﬁcant
impact on exchange rate pressure and hence on the onset of the Mexican Peso crisis.
Furthermore, we tried to verify the theoretical result that information disparity had
an individual eﬀect on exchange rate pressure that was contingent both on the market
sentiment and on the source of uncertainty.
Our regression analysis comes to a favourable result with respect to both questions. We
can show that an optimistic market generally decreases exchange rate pressure, while
a pessimistic market has the opposite eﬀect. Moreover, the speciﬁcation of information
disparity that we chose for our regression equation has a positive inﬂuence on exchange
rate pressure in an optimistic market and a negative impact in a pessimistic environ-
ment. Comparing the market sentiment as observed during the Mexican crisis using
data provided by Consensus Economics with the actual development of fundamentals,
our model indicates that the major source driving uncertainty was public information.
This ﬁnding leads us to conclude that the strategy of creating intransparency about
monetary aggregates as conducted by the Mexican central bank was detrimental to the
stability of the exchange rate peg. Our empirical ﬁndings are thus in line with theo-
retical work by Heinemann and Metz (2002), which demonstrates that the success of
information policy by monetary authorities is very sensitive to the market sentiment
and to the way in which information is disseminated. In the case of the Mexican cri-
sis, our model indicates that is was not necessarily the pure variation in speculators’
perceptions about monetary aggregates, but rather the fact that the central bank was
publicly known to not give any information about international currency reserves, that
might have triggered the crisis.
21References
[1] Calvo, G., Mendoza, E., Rogers, J., Rose, A., 1996. Foreword: Speculative Attacks
in Emerging Markets: What has Mexico Taught Us? A Symposium. Journal of
International Economics 41, 219–222.
[2] Dornbusch, R., Werner, A., 1994. Mexico: Stabilization, Reform, and No Growth.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 253–297.
[3] Edwards, S., 1997. The Mexican Peso Crisis: How Much Did We Know? When
Did We Know It? NBER Working Paper 6334.
[4] Edwards, S., Savastano, M., 1998. The Morning After: The Mexican Peso In The
Aftermath Of The 1994 Currency Crisis. NBER Working Paper 6516.
[5] Frankel, J., Schmukler, S., 1996. Country Fund Discounts, Asymmetric Informa-
tion and the Mexican Crisis of 1994: Did Local Residents Turn Pessimistic Before
International Investors? NBER Working Paper 5714.
[6] Gil-Diaz, F., 1997. The Origin of Mexico’s 1994 Financial Crisis. The Cato Journal
17 (3).
[7] Gourieroux, C., Monfort, A., 1997. Time series and dynamic models. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, MA.
[8] Heinemann, F., Illing, G., 2002. Speculative Attacks: Unique Equilibrium and
Transparency. Journal of International Economics 58 (2), 429-450.
[9] Heinemann, F., Metz, C.E., 2002. Optimal Risk Taking and Information Policy
to Avoid Currency and Liquidity Crises. University of Kassel Discussion Paper
31/02.
[10] Lustig, N., 1995. The Mexican Peso Crisis: the Foreseeable and the Surprise.
Brookings Discussion Papers in International Economics 114.
[11] Metz, C.E., 2002. Private and Public Information in Self-Fulﬁlling Currency
Crises. Journal of Economics 76 (1), 65-85.
[12] Metz, C.E., 2003. Information Dissemination in Currency Crises. Springer, Berlin
Heidelberg New York.
22[13] Morris, S., Rob, R., Shin, H.S., 1995. p-Dominance and Belief Potential, Econo-
metrica 63 (1), 145-157.
[14] Morris, S., Shin, H.S., 1998. Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulﬁlling
Currency Attacks. American Economic Review 88, 587-597.
[15] Morris, S., Shin, H.S., 1999. Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt, Cowles
Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1241. Forthcoming in European Economic Re-
view.
[16] Morris, S., Shin, H.S., 2000. Global Games: Theory and Applications. In: De-
watripont, M., Hansen, L., Turnovsky, S. (Eds.), Advances in Economics and
Econometrics, the Eighth World Congress, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
[17] Obstfeld, M., 1994. The Logic of Currency Crises. Cahiers Economiques et Mon-
etaires 43, 189–213.
[18] Obstfeld, M., 1996. Models of Currency Crises with Self-Fulﬁlling Features. Eu-
ropean Economic Review 40, 1037-1047.
[19] Prati, A., Sbracia, M., 2002. Currency Crises and Uncertainty About Fundamen-
tals. IMF Working Paper 02/3.
[20] Tillmann, T., 2002. Information Disparities and the Probability of Currency



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































¤ signiﬁcance at 1, 5, and 10 percent
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